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DLD-177       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3995 
___________ 
 
ELMER RODRIGUEZ, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ELIZABETH NICHOLS, Dauphin County Prison Warden  
in Lieu of the Department of Correction; 
ARAMARK, in Lieu of the Department of Correction Supervisors 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1:12-cv-00629) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)  
Or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 28, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed April 18, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Elmer Rodriguez appeals from the District Court‟s order dismissing his complaint.  For 
the following reasons, we will summarily affirm.  
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I. 
 Rodriguez, who at the time was incarcerated at the Dauphin County Prison, filed a civil 
rights complaint, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania against Elizabeth Nichols, the prison warden, and Aramark, the prison‟s food 
supplier.  Rodriguez alleged that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by serving 
him food containing “rodent body parts.”    
 The Magistrate Judge concluded at screening that the complaint failed to state a viable 
claim but granted Rodriguez leave to file an amended complaint.  Subsequently, the Magistrate 
Judge recommended dismissal of the amended complaint, determining that the allegations 
failed to state a § 1983 claim because Rodriguez (1) alleged only a single instance of 
contamination of his food, (2) suggested the Warden took appropriate actions after the 
incident, and (3) alleged no facts suggesting that a policy or custom of Aramark caused a 
violation of his rights.  Over Rodriguez‟s objections, the District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge‟s recommendation and dismissed the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2).  Rodriguez timely appealed.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary 
review over the District Court‟s dismissal.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  To survive dismissal, a plaintiff‟s complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).   
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  At bottom, Rodriguez‟s complaint is premised on a one-time adulteration of his food, 
which he believes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  He is mistaken.  “It is obduracy 
and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct 
prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”  Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 
319 (1986).  “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for 
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 
(1994).  “[A]n accident or inadvertence or mere negligence does not [in itself] trigger the 
Eighth Amendment.”  Grabowski v. Jackson Cnty. Pub. Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1395 
n.12 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)).  Rodriguez‟s 
complaint did not plausibly allege anything more than simple negligence, if that.   
 Rodriguez claimed that the Warden failed to implement and enforce a policy of proper 
food safety and that she had admitted responsibility after the incident by directing that new 
measures be taken.  Tellingly, however, Rodriguez did not point to any facts suggesting that, 
prior to the incident, either Defendant was aware of and disregarded an excessive or substantial 
risk to him.  Perhaps Rodriguez was suggesting that Defendants, as employers, should be held 
liable for the unusual one-time event he described.  Liability, however, requires personal 
participation in unlawful conduct and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of 
respondeat superior.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  Moreover, 
Rodriguez has not plausibly alleged that Defendants at any time had a policy or custom of 
serving contaminated food.  At all events, Rodriguez‟s allegations simply do not rise to the 
standard necessary to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim.  See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.   
 4 
 
 For the reasons given, the District Court properly dismissed Rodriguez‟s complaint 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 
3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.     
 
